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You Don’t Have to Pay the Troll Toll:
Antitrust Violations of Patent Assertion
Entities and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
“Sham Litigation” Exception
by KATHERYN M. WENGER*
Introduction
For years, Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”)1 have permeated in the
field of intellectual property law for acquiring massive patent portfolios
(likely from companies, inventors, or other non-practicing entities) for
pecuniary gain through expensive licensing and enforcement litigation. But
now potential patent enforcement defendants may be able to assert antitrust
counterclaims in such actions.2 PAEs predatorily enforce their entire
portfolio on alleged infringers3 that may only infringe on one or two of the
patents in their business operations or products. It is for this reason PAEs
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2020;
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, Bachelor of Arts in Political Science,
Concentration in Pre-Law, 2011. This Note is dedicated to my father, Brad, who inspires me every
day to go out to achieve my goals; to my mother, Marie, for her constant support; to my brothers,
Will and John, for teaching me everything I know about hard work and discipline. To Professor
Sam Miller for introducing me to antitrust law and guidance on this note. To my undergraduate
mentor and professor, Ronald Den Otter, for giving me a strong legal foundation. And, to all of
my former law firm colleagues and friends who have helped me along the way.
1. For purposes of this Note, PAEs are entities that acquire patents from patent owners,
typically manufacturing firms, to solely aggregate massive portfolios that contain hundreds or
thousands of patents. Therefore, this Note does not include other types of PAEs, such as
universities and research institutions, which are not engaged in for-profit enforcement.
2. Per the Federal Trade Commission’s PAE study, PAEs are defined as: “businesses that
acquire patents from third parties and seek to generate revenue by asserting them against alleged
infringers. PAEs monetize their patents primarily through licensing negotiations with alleged
infringers, infringement litigation, or both. In other words, PAEs do not rely on producing,
manufacturing, or selling goods.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY
1 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftcstudy/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf.
3. Note, in this context, “alleged infringers” refer to parties that PAEs enforce their patents
against and, therefore, are in direct competition with the PAEs.
[557]
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are commonly known as “patent trolls.”4 PAEs have become notorious for
filing excessive patent enforcement serial suits. The Federal Trade
Commission, in its 2016 report on PAEs (“The FTC Report”), found that
PAEs accounted for ninety-six percent of all patent infringement lawsuits.5
The FTC observed PAE two business models: Portfolio PAEs and
Litigation PAEs.6 Note, some PAEs (like Intellectual Ventures) invoke both
business models. Portfolio PAEs negotiate expensive licenses for portfolios
comprised of hundreds of thousands of patents, typically in the millions of
dollars.7 Moreover, in The FTC Report, Portfolio PAEs accounted for
ninety-one percent of the reported licenses but generated eighty percent of
the reported revenue, or approximately $3.2 billion.8

The source for this table is cited below.9
4. See Will Kenton, What Is a Patent Troll, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, https://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/p/patent-troll.asp (updated Jan. 11, 2020) (“A patent troll is a derogatory term
sued to describe a company that uses patent infringement claims to win court judgments for profit
or to stifle competition. The term may be used to describe a number of business activities that
utilize patents and the court system to earn money.); see also Marianna Galstyan, Who Are Patent
Trolls and How Do They Work, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/inve
sting/071515/who-are-patent-trolls-how-do-they-work.asp (updated Apr. 15, 2017); Nick Statt,
“Apple ordered to pay patent troll more than $500 million in iMessage case”, THEVERGE.COM,
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/10/17222380/apple-virtnetx-patent-troll-litigation-500-millionimessage-facetime-case (Apr. 10, 2018, 7:38 PM EDT); “Patent Trolls”, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims (last visited Mar. 26,
2020) (“A patent troll uses patens as legal weapons, instead of actually creating any new products
or coming up with new ideas. Instead, trolls are in the business of litigation (or even threatening
litigation. They often buy up patents cheaply from companies down on their luck who are looking
to monetize what resources they have left, such as patents.”).
5. Id.
6. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 2.
7. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.
8. Id.
9. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.; see also FTC Study Appendix A: Glossary of
Frequently Used Terms. “Study PAE” means any PAE for which this study presents patent
assertion data. The group of “Study PAEs” includes all “Responding PAEs and “Affiliates.”
“Responding PAE” means one of the 22 PAEs that received the PAE Special Order and submitted
information used in this study. “Affiliates” refers to entities identified as affiliates by a Responding
PAE, including “wholly or partially owned subsidiaries” and “other person(s) over which the firm
exercises or has exercised supervision or control,” that sent demands, sued for patent infringement,
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Conversely, Litigation PAEs raise revenue by often suing for potential
licensees and settling shortly afterward by entering into license agreements.10
The portfolios typically contain fewer than ten patents. Additionally, these
licenses have yielded revenues of approximately $300,000 annually, which
accounts for the lower-end of early-stage litigation costs to defend a patent
infringement suit.11 Furthermore, for every new patent portfolio acquired,
Litigation PAEs create a new affiliated entity, or “shell company.”12
Moreover, sixty-six percent of Litigation PAE cases tracked in The FTC
Report settled within one year.13 And, of the ninety-six percent of cases
examined in The FTC Report, litigation yielded only twenty percent of the
reported revenue (approximately $800 million). This is because the PAEs
generally operated with little or no working capital and relied on agreements
to share future revenue with patent sellers to fund their businesses.14
Ultimately, Portfolio PAE licenses generated larger amounts in total
royalties, on average, than revenue yielded by Litigation PAE licenses.15
Now, alleged PAE infringers may have viable antitrust claims to
combat Portfolio PAEs and Litigation PAEs as unlawful under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act (“Section 2”), Section 7 of the Clayton Act (“Section 7”),
and Noerr-Pennington sham litigation protection.16 This Note explores
or licensed patents within the study period. See Appendix C: PAE Special Order, Specification
B.2.
10. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 4.
11. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 4.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 6 n.6; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: A
CHANGE IN PATENTEE FORTUNES 14 (2015), https://ipcloseup.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/2015pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf (finding that between 2010 and 2014, the average lifespan for
patent lawsuits from initial filing to trial was twenty-nine months).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Bill DeVinney, Are The Patent Trolls Vulnerable to Antitrust Claims?, BAKER
HOSTETLER: THE ANTITRUST ADVOCATE (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.antitrustadvocate.com/
2016/02/01/are-the-patent-trolls-vulnerable-to-antitrust-claims; the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004) (“§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court . . . . § 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.”); Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Section 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (2000) (“No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any
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possible antitrust claims in the context of current patent infringement cases17
and propose patent litigation reform solutions to remedy this costly legal
issue. Further, this Note evaluates the following questions: Do alleged PAE
infringers have sufficient antitrust standing to bring the alleged crossclaims
by suffering an antitrust injury under Section 2 and Section 7? Do alleged
infringers’ pleadings sufficiently allege facts to support a plausible inference
that PAEs unlawfully hold a monopoly over the relevant market? Lastly,
under the First Amendment, are PAEs entitled to assert immunity under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine?
Accordingly, this Note analyzes the viable antitrust violations
stemming from PAE portfolio and litigation business models, which
constitute anticompetitive conduct. Moreover, this Note determines why
PAEs are not afforded Noerr-Pennington immunity to enforce their
portfolios under the “sham litigation” exception. Section I introduces and
discusses the Note’s case study Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One
Financial Corporation (“IV” and “Capital One,” respectively). In this serial
litigation, IV engaged in anticipative conduct when it exercised monopoly
power by asserting its portfolio against Capital One. And, subsequently, how
Capital One responded with antitrust counterclaims. Section I also
introduces how the federal courts erred in these holdings and posits the
policy consequences of these wrongly decided decisions.
Section II addresses the issue of antitrust standing, specifically antitrust
injury. Further, antitrust injury is analyzed to determine whether accused
infringers have antitrust standing to assert antitrust counterclaims in
enforcement actions. Section III applies the operative antitrust regime and
relevant standards to the PAEs generally, as well as the to the Capital One
serial litigation study. This analysis leads to the finding that alleged
infringers, such as Capital One, have viable antitrust counterclaims against
PAEs, such as IV.
Section IV determines that, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, PAEs
are not immune to antitrust claims when they exercise their right to petition
the court for relief because their enforcement serial suits constitute a “sham
litigation,” under the proper California Motor standard.18 However, even if
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use
of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly . . . .”); E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-45 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965).
17. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332 (2017); Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13cv0740 (AJT/TCB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155525 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2015).
18. The California Motor standard to serial litigation requires that the first prong of the PREI
“sham litigation” exception test should not be based on whether any of the proceedings have merit
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the Professional Real Estate Investors (“PREI”) “sham litigation” exception
standard19 for single suits applied, PAEs still fail to meet this standard
because these suits are objectively and subjectively baseless. Finally,
Section V offers possible solutions to prevent this anticompetitive conduct
in both the PAE Portfolio and PAE Litigation business models.

Summary of Findings
The findings in this Note are as follows: PAE patent portfolios are
plausibly defined relevant markets,20 as required by U.S. antitrust law.21
Moreover, alleged infringers may sufficiently claim that PAEs hold an
unlawful monopoly by controlling at least seventy percent of the relative
market.22 Further, this Note finds that PAEs use their monopoly power for

but, rather, “whether they are brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without
regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a market rival.” USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra
Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) ).
19. The PREI standard holds that for a non-serial lawsuit qualify as a sham litigation, the suit
must be: (1) “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits”; and (2) “subjectively baseless and an attempt to interest with competitors.”
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1368 (quoting PREI, 508 U.S. at 60-61 (1993)).
20. JONATHAN M. JACOBSON, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1-2 (8th ed. 2017) (“To
determine whether monopoly power exists, it is necessary to define the relevant market in which
the power over price or competition is to be appraised . . . . A relevant market has both product
and geographic dimensions. Court have held that defining a relevant product market is a factintensive inquiry and the failure to properly please such a market ‘is rarely grounds for dismissal.’
However, at the pleadings state, a plaintiff’s proposed relevant market must be ‘plausible,’ and
‘must bear a rational relation to the methodology courts prescribe to define a market for antitrust
purposes—analysis of interchangeability of use or the elasticity of demand’ to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . . Defining the relevant market for purposes of Sherman Act Section
2 presents the same issues as defining the relevant market for other antitrust purposes, including
Sherman Act Section 1 and Clayton Act Section 7.”).
21. Section 1 of the Sherman Act criminalizes restraint on trade or commerce within the
United States and foreign nations. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act declares
monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy to monopolize illegal subject to criminal
penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 2. Section 7 of the Clayton Act expands on Section 2 by prohibited those
engaged in commercial activating from acquiring whole or any part of the assets of another engaged
in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to “substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18.
22. See “Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act: Chapter 2”, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/
competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-2 (last
visited Mar. 26, 2020) (observing monopoly power to be at least 70% dominant market share); see
generally 1 Section of Antitrust Law, Am. Bar Ass’n, Antitrust Law Developments 231 (6th ed.
2007) (“A market share in excess of 70 percent generally establishes a prima facie case of monopoly
power, at least with evidence of substantial barriers to entry and evidence that existing competitors
could not expand output.” (footnotes omitted)); A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law (2d ed. 2002) ¶ 801a, at 319 (“Although one cannot be too categorical, we believe it
reasonable to presume the existence of substantial single-firm market power from a showing that
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exclusionary acts resulting in anticompetition, patent misuse, and extortive
practices within the relative market of their patent portfolios. Moreover, this
Note concluded that PAEs “hold up” alleged infringers by forcing these
targeted parties to either license their patent portfolio, which includes many
unnecessary and allegedly invalid patents or face costly litigation solely for
market gain. This unlawful conduct results in an antitrust injury. Finally,
this Note determined PAEs do not have Noerr-Pennington immunity in these
suits because they constitute “sham litigation.” This is because PAEs initiate
enforcement actions not based on the merits of their patents but for the
purpose of directly interfering with alleged infringers’ businesses.
Therefore, alleged infringers may assert antitrust counterclaims.

I.
Serial Litigation Case Study:
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corporation
Currently, there are numerous pending PAE enforcement matters
pending in federal courts. In serial litigation form, these matters in question
involve the same two parties: IV and Capital One. This Note discusses two
of those suits in detail. The first suit was filed in the Eastern District of
Virginia, where the district court incorrectly held Capital One did not
properly define the relevant market in its antitrust counterclaims. And, in
doing so, Capital One failed to allege IV asserted unlawful monopoly power
when it initiated the lawsuit.23
The second suit was filed in the Southern District of Maryland.24 The
Maryland district court did find that Capital One properly defined the market.
But, the Maryland district court erred when it ultimately held that NoerrPennington immunity applied.25 Following the discussion of these cases,
Sections II, III, and IV demonstrate why both the Virginia district court,
Maryland district court, and, subsequently the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit all erred in their rulings regarding the antitrust claims only.26
For some background, IV describes itself as two companies whose
businesses purchase important inventions and then license the inventions to
those who need them.27 Moreover, IV purchased more than 70,000 assets
the defendant’s share of a well-defined market protected by sufficient entry barriers has exceeded
70 or 75 percent for the five years preceding the complaint.”).
23. Intellectuel Ventures I LLC, et al. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00740
(AJT/TRJ) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) .
24. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 3d 691 (D. Md.
2017).
25. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 937 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
26. The Maryland court also granted summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds due
to the Virginia court’s decision, which the Federal Circuit affirmed. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
280 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (D. Md. 2017).
27. Complaint at 4, Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One Fin. Corp. (2014) (No. 14-0111).
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and earned more than $3 billion by licensing its patent portfolios to other
companies.28 Further, as of 2015, IV reportedly filed suit against more than
30 companies since 2010.29 Note, IV sued some of these companies on
multiple occasions.30 Thus, in the years since, IV has threatened even more
companies over (and likely taken to court over) patent infringement claims
unless these potential defendants agree to license IV’s entire patent portfolio.
A. Eastern District of Virginia

On June 19, 2013, IV filed suit against Capital One in the Eastern
District of Virginia alleging patent infringement.31 In their complaint, IV
alleged that when Capital One refused to enter into a licensing agreement
with IV, they infringed on IV’s financial-services patent portfolio, which is
comprised of 3,500 patents.32 However, IV only sought to enforce five of its
patents within the portfolio, dropped two of the patents, and left three
asserted patents in contention.33
In response, Capital One asserted Section 2 and Section 7 antitrust
claims based on IV’s anticompetitive conduct when it extorted Capital One
to license its entire financial-services portfolio.34 Moreover, Capital One
asserted a “patent misuse” defense.35 Specifically, Capital One claimed IV
engaged in patent misuse through: (1) impermissible collection of royalties
from licensing invalid and unenforceable patents; and (2) unlawful
monopolization of the relevant market.36
IV subsequently moved to dismiss these counterclaims and asserted
affirmative defenses, as well as moved for a separate trial on these antitrust
and patent misuse issues and to stay discovery on such issues.37 On
December 5, 2013, the Virginia district court granted IV’s motion to dismiss
Capital One’s antitrust claims.38 In its ruling, the Virginia district court
rejected Capital One’s proposed relevant market of IV’s financial-services
patent portfolio. And, thus, the Virginia district court did not find IV wielded
unlawful monopoly power.39
28. Id. at 5.
29. Jacob Demmit, Intellectual Ventures: 70,000 Patents, $3 Billion in Licenses, Dozens of
Companies Sued, PUGET SOUND BUSINESS JOURNAL (Feb. 11, 2015, 2:05 PM), https://www.bizjo
urnals.com/seattle/blog/techflash/2015/02/intellectual-ventures-70-000-patents-3-billion-in.html.
30. Id.
31. Intellectuel Ventures I LLC, No. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *4.
32. Complaint at 7-15. 13, Intellectuel Ventures I LLC, No. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836.
33. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *4.
34. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *4.
35. Id.
36. Id. at *4-5.
37. Id. at *4.
38. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *35.
39. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1371.
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However, the Virginia district court erred in rejecting Capital One’s
proposed relevant market, which is necessary to establish plausible claims of
anticompetitive conduct that violates Section 2 and Section 7. In their
proposal, Capital One defined the relevant market as IV’s “portfolio of 3,500
or more patents that . . . cover widely used financial and retail banking
services’ in the United States.”40 The Virginia district court struck down this
relevant market because “Capital One did not allege that the proposed market
consisted of ‘an area of effected competition’ between IV and the
commercial banks who are the alleged victims of IV’s anticompetitive
conduct.”41 Moreover, the Virginia district court held that there was “no
commercial market for IV’s patent portfolio” and:
[T]he actual technologies included within the proposed
market . . . appear nearly irrelevant, since it is no the substantive,
commercial usefulness or the merits of the technology that
defines the market; but simply the patents in the market used to
threaten Capital One, which consist entirely of IV’s patent
portfolio.42
IV and Capital One both appealed the Virginia district court’s decision
to the Federal Circuit.43 IV initially appealed the Virginia court’s rulings on
patent ineligibility and claim construction.44 Capital One cross-appealed the
dismissal of the antitrust claims.45 However, Capital One later dismissed its
cross-appeal of the Virginia court’s adverse judgement after the Maryland
district court granted Capital One’s motion to assert antirust counterclaims
in that case.46

B. Southern District of Maryland

While the Virginia case was still pending, IV filed another suit in the
Southern District of Maryland asserting five separate patents.47 More
specifically, IV alleged Capitol One infringed on five of its patents “[i]n
connection with the online banking services and other [electronic] systems

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *15, 17-18, 25, 30.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1363.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1365.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1363.
Id.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1363.
Memorandum Opinion at 1, Intellectual Ventures, 280 F. Supp. 3d 691(emphasis).
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and services” they provide.48 Capital One responded with Section 2 and
Section 7 counterclaims, and sought declaratory judgment of
noninfringement or invalidity of the asserted patents and unenforceability
of one patent due to inequitable conduct.49 The counterclaims contended
that “IV’s creation and abuse of monopoly power to hold up (in other
words extort) Capital One and other banks violates Section 2 of the
Sherman Act [15 U.S.C. § 2] and Section 7 of the Clayton Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 18].”50 These counterclaims arose because of, inter alia, IV’s ongoing
anticompetitive conduct, internal documents produced in the Virginia
action, serial suits IV filed in other districts, and events in IV’s initial
lawsuit against Capital One.51
The Maryland district court rejected IV’s motion to dismiss and allowed
Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims to move forward. All asserted patents,
except one, were either withdrawn or rejected by the Maryland district court
as invalid or unenforceable. However, the Maryland district court granted
summary judgment in favor of IV on the antitrust counterclaims, holding that
the Noerr-Pennington immunized IV from such claims.52 The Maryland
district court’s opinion demonstrated that it recognized Capital One’s
Section 2 and Section 7 claims rested on viable allegations, in which IV
acquired dominant market power through patent acquisition, aggregation,
concealment, and litigation resulting in an unlawful monopoly in the relevant
market. Through its monopoly power, IV demanded expensive licenses and
threatened costly litigation against those parties that refused, such as with
Capital One. IV’s demand came in the form of “take-it-or-leave-it,”
supracompetitive royalties to license its entire financial-services portfolio,
comprised of approximately 3,500 patents.
However, in his opinion granting IV’s motion for summary judgment,
Judge Paul Grimm held that Noerr-Pennington immunized IV from Capital
One’s antitrust counterclaims.53 Judge Grimm reasoned that IV was
afforded Noerr-Pennington protection under the Professional Real Estate,
Inc. (“PREI”) “sham litigation” standard, which was established by the
Supreme Court.54
1. Federal Circuit Appellate Decision and United States Department of
Justice Intervention

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Intellectual Ventures, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 694.
Intellectual Ventures, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 694, 705-716.
Id. at 711 (citing PREI, 508 U.S. 49).
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Capital One, of course, appealed the Maryland district court’s decision
to the Federal Circuit, which issued its decision in September of 2019.55
Capital One challenged the Maryland court’s holding that Noerr-Pennington
doctrine immunized IV’s anticompetitive conduct from antitrust
counterclaims.56 However, the Federal Circuit rejected Capital One’s
arguments and affirmed the Maryland district court’s order to resolve the
antitrust counterclaims against Capital One by granting IV’s motion for
summary judgment.57
Capital One based their appeal of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine issue
on two points. First, Capital One asserted the district court erred in
immunizing IV from antitrust scrutiny for conduct that violates Section 2
and Section 7.58 Second, even if Noerr-Pennington did apply, Capital One
argued that the district court erred when it applied the PREI sham litigation
standard59 for single lawsuits rather than the California Motor standard60 for
serial litigation.61 Capital One advocated for California Motor standard
application with, in sum, the following evidence:
(1) IV filed serial lawsuits against Capital One involving 10
unrelated patents, as well as over a dozen lawsuits against other
banks, an failed to succeed on a single claim; (2) internal IV
documents admit that its patent portfolio is nothing but ‘fluff’ and
‘filler,’ and that IV was using litigation as a “hammer” or “forcing
function” to attempt to strong-arm targets into licensing thousands
of patents that its targets neither needed (because they were not
infringed) nor wanted (because they were likely invalid); and (3)
IV’s licensing demands were based on a target’s overall revenues
rather than any inventive contribution of the patents or use of the
patents by the targets.62
Thus, by sheer application of the facts to the definition of “serial
litigation” it seems like common sense that the California Motor standard is
55. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d 1359.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1362.
58. Corrected Nonconfidential Brief for Appellants (“Brief for Appellants”), at 1-3,
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1368.
59. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1368 (quoting PREI, 508 U.S. at 6061 (1993)).
60. See USS-POSCO Indus., 31 F.3d at 811 (citing California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) ).
61. Brief for Appellants at 39-50, Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 937 F.3d
1359 (2019) (No. 18-1367).
62. Brief for Appellants at 2, Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 937 F.3d 1359
(2019) (No. 18-1367).
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proper because IV filed multiple patent enforcement suits against Capital
One in various district courts around the same time.
During the appeal, the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division (“DOJ”) submitted an amicus curiae brief as an intervening party.63
This intervention as an interested third party underscores the imperativeness
of proper Noerr-Pennington application to suspected PAEs’ anticompetitive
conduct because of its great potential to impact on future DOJ prosecutions.
Therefore, by filing their amicus brief, the DOJ signaled to the Federal
Circuit that any decision they make on the Noerr-Pennington issue will
impact DOJ investigations and prosecutions of PAEs.
The DOJ’s amicus brief sought clarification from the Federal Circuit as
to whether, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a non-sham patentinfringement suit shields an anticompetitive patent acquisition from Section
2 and Section 7 antitrust scrutiny.64 The government took the position that,
if it reaches the Noerr-Pennington doctrine issue, the Federal Circuit should
clarify that the doctrine does not protect anticompetitive patent acquisitions
from antitrust liability regardless of whether the patent acquirer engages in
protected litigation.65 The Federal Circuit, however, did not take the time
rule on the issue of Noerr-Pennington because collateral estoppel stemming
from the Virginia action precluded the Maryland action.66
C. The Negative Competition Consequences and Policy Implications
of the Federal Circuit’s Affirmations of the District Courts’ Rulings

The United States Constitution created the U.S. Patent System by
providing Congress with the power to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”67 However,
PAE patent enforcement conduct runs counter to the U.S. patent public
policy of promotion of competitiveness and innovation.68 By affirming the
Maryland district court, the Federal Circuit unjustly afforded IV patent
rights beyond the intended scope of the law—imposing dire consequences
to competition.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution plainly states that
the purpose of patents is to promote “Science and useful Arts.”69 But PAEs
63. Brief for the United States of America and The Federal Trade Commission As Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party (Corrected)(“DOJ Amicus Brief”), Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
937 F.3d 1359.
64. DOJ Amicus Brief”) at 1-2, Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d 1359.
65. Id. at 10-11.
66. Intellectual Ventures I, LLC, 937 F.3d at 1369.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69. Id.
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obtain most of their revenues through the expensive licensing of large, vague
patent portfolios and aggressively litigating against those who refuse. This
practice restricts the ability of companies to innovate due to depleted
monetary and human resources, along with possible restrictions on
technology use.
This type of anticompetitive conduct became such a problem that the
United States implemented rigorous procedural steps to limit it.70 The
reformative steps included: narrowing the scope of patent-eligible
inventions, creating rapid and relatively inexpensive administrative
procedures (e.g., Patent Trial & Appeal Board). These steps made it more
difficult for PAEs to file infringement suits, and making it easier for
successful alleged infringes to collect attorneys’ fees and costs. However,
despite these reforms, PAE infringement suits reached an all-time high in
2015 with PAE suits responsible for the vast majority of patent litigation. It
follows that the implemented reforms little, or arguably nothing at all, to
hinder PAE predatory infringement suits.
Denying alleged PAE infringers to assert antitrust counterclaims stifles
innovation and affords PAEs patent rights greater than the intended purpose
patent protection—disclosure of an invention for a secured exclusive right to
the invention (also known as the “patent bargain”).71 PAEs (like IV) abuse
this system when they force competitors to license an entire patent portfolio
instead of just the necessary patent(s). Therefore, in their affirmation of the
Maryland district court’s decision, the Federal Circuit set a bad precedent
that drastically depletes innovation and grants PAEs considerable patent
rights, which goes against the purpose of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.

II.

Competitors Suffer Antitrust Injury Due to PAEs’
Anticompetitive Conduct in the Relevant Market

A. Constitutional and Antitrust Standing

To survive the pleading stage in an antitrust action, the alleging party
must satisfy the requirements of both constitutional and antitrust standing.72
As a preliminary matter, a suing party must establish constitutional standing
before arguing its case in federal court by proving three elements.73 First,
70. See Steven Seidenberg, US Perspectives: Despite US Reforms, Patent Trolls Are Thriving
– For Now, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, https://www.ip-watch.org/2016/02/26/ despite-usreforms-patent-trolls-are-thriving-for-now/ (Feb. 26, 2016).
71. See Ron D. Katznelson, Private Patent Rights, the Patent Bargain and the Fiction of
Administrative “Error Correction” in Inter Partes Review, Bi-Level Technologies, p. 6,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3077970 (Dec. 4, 2017).
72. See Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-587 (1986) (citing Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
73. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) .
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the party must suffer an injury-in-fact, which is “concrete and particularized”
and “actual or imminent,” not conjectural or hypothetical.74 Second, there
must be a causal “fairly traceable” connection between the injury and
conduct.75 Third, it must be “likely”—not merely speculative—that the
traceable injury would be “redressed by a favorable decision.”76
For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs, a group of wildlife conservation and other environmental
organizations, lacked standing to litigate their generalized grievances against
certain U.S. regulations in federal court.77 The Court noted that Section
7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”) requires federal
agencies to consult with the U.S. Secretary of the Interior or the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce before taking any actions that might negatively
impact endangered species.78 Moreover, the ESA permits any person to
initiate a civil suit on their own behalf to enjoin anyone from violating the
ESA.79 After the Secretaries promulgated a new interpretation of the
provision, limiting the ESA’s geographic scope, the plaintiffs sued the
defendant and Secretary of the Interior Lujan, seeking a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief to restore the initial interpretation of the
ESA.80 They attempted to assert standing by arguing that threats to
endangered species constitutes an injury through a “vocational nexus”81
injury theory of threats to wildlife affecting individuals pursuing a vocation
related to animals.82
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Majority, rejected the plaintiffs’
arguments. The Court held: (1) not every person with a professional interest
in such animals has standing to sue under a “vocational nexus”; (2) a person
with an interest in an animal does not automatically have standing to enjoin
federal threats to that species of animal anywhere in the world;83 and (3) the
74. Id.
75. Id. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
76. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
77. Id. at 575.
78. Id. at 558-559.
79. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
80. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
81. Under the “vocational nexus” theory, anyone with a professional interest in [endangered]
animals have standing to sue. Id. at 566.
82. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 506.
83. Id. at 566-67. The Court went on to reason that although a “person who observes or
works with a particular animal threated by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm,” and
although “it is even plausible—though it goes to the outermost limit of plausibility—to think that
a person who observes or works with animals of a particular species in the very area of the world
where that species is threatened by a federal decision is facing such harm,” it is “pure speculation
and fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with endangered species, anywhere in the
world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species with which
[that person] has no more specific connection.” (emphasis added). Id.
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United States Supreme Court declined to adopt a theory that would allow
standing to all plaintiffs whose interest in the threatened animals is
“genuine.” Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims failed to
demonstrate that jeopardizing endangered species caused them an imminent,
particular injury because the injury claimed was a generalized grievance.
Moreover, specific antitrust standing must be established in order to
litigate a claim on antitrust grounds.84 The Supreme Court recognized that
“provid[ing] a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be
traced to an antitrust violation”85 because it can cause “ripples of harm” that
rip through the national economy.86 The Court, thus, found it reasonable to
assume that “Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially
affect by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold
damages for the injury to his business or property.”87 Courts adhere to this
particular legislative intent by determining “antitrust standing.”88
Antitrust standing is established when, in addition to the constitutional
injury in fact, a private party suffered an “antitrust injury.”89 An “antitrust
injury” must satisfy a two-prong test: (i) “the injury is of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent,” and (ii) the injury “flows from that which
makes defendants’ act unlawful.”90 Because a constitutional standing injury
presents a lower threshold than an antitrust injury, a constitutional injury is
simultaneously established if an antitrust injury is sufficiently pled.91
Moreover, under the rule of reason,92 the Supreme Court held that the
antitrust injury “should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the
violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation” in the

84. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 534 (1983) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972) ).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535 (citing Blue Shield of Virginia v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1982)); see The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15(a) (“[A]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefore in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
88. Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Medicine, 428 F.3d 408, 436-38 (2d Cir. 2005) .
89. Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle, Northeast, Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007)
.
90. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
91. Port Dock & Stone Corp., 507 F.3d at 117, 121.
92. See MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1139 (1983)
(“The Rule of Reason is a rule of construction which applies to section 1 of the Sherman Act . . . .
[U]nder the Rule of Reason only agreements which are unreasonably restrictive of competition
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.”) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55
(1911)).
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relevant market.93 Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to sufficiently plead
antitrust claims, the plaintiff must allege an affirmative act (or acts) relating
to the enforcement of the patent holder’s rights through anticompetitive
behavior, and that the injury suffered reflects the anticompetitive effects of
said acts.94
B. PAEs’ Unlawful Monopoly Power Causes Antitrust Injury

Monopoly power is defined as “the power to control prices or exclude
competition” in the relevant market.95 Moreover, in order to sufficiently
plead an antitrust claim, a plaintiff must allege a plausible “relevant market
in which competition will be impaired.”96 The burden is on the plaintiff to
define the relevant market within which anticompetitive effects directly
injured the plaintiff due to the defendant’s anticompetitive actions.97 Thus,
alleged infringers must demonstrate that the accusing PAE’s extortive
conduct had “substantial effects on competition” within the relevant market
of the patent portfolio in question.98 Also, in order to prove an antitrust
injury, the plaintiff must demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of restraint
within that relevant market.99 The general rule is that one market player
dominating seventy-percent or more of the relevant market is circumstantial
evidence of monopoly power.100 Also, plaintiffs must show that such market
share places high barriers on entry into the relevant market for new
competitors.101 These barriers must operate to constrain operation of the
market beyond self-correction.102
Alleged infringers may claim that the accusing PAE violated Section 2
by holding an unlawful monopoly and using that monopoly power to engage
in anticompetitive behavior to acquire expensive patent portfolio licenses.
Further, alleged infringers can argue the accusing PAE violate the Section 7
patent misuse doctrine because the accusing PAE unlawfully acquired and
aggregated its patent portfolio. Such allegations are evidenced by PAEs’
business models, and history of and continued retaliatory litigious conduct
93. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489; see also id. (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for “the protection of
competition, not competitors. It is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award damages for the
type of injury claimed here.’”)).
94. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .
95. United States v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (quoting United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ).
96. New York v. Group Health Inc., 649 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2011) .
97. Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 962 (6th Cir. 2011).
98. United States v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) .
99. Thurman Indus. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1989) .
100. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 450 (4th Cir. 2011) .
101. Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th
Cir. 1997).
102. Id.
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in order to license their entire patent portfolio (not just the necessary patent)
at an expensive rate. This conduct places a barrier to entry into the patent
portfolio relevant market because alleged infringers must either (1) license
the entire patent portfolio or (2) risk an expensive retaliation enforcement
suit, which could potentially go on for years.103
As explained preciously, PAEs’ business models involve acquiring
and aggregating patents into large portfolios in order to receive a windfall
from expensive license. Moreover, usually no valid substitute outside of
the portfolio exists. So enforcement targets are basically extorted into
taking out such a broad license because they want to avoid even more costly
litigation. PAEs’ unfairly overcharge in their licenses fees because they
require the licensees to license the entire portfolio. If these licensees
refuse, then PAEs’ initiate enforcement suits. The Capital One cases
underscore this nefarious phenomenon.104
In Capital One, IV acquired, aggregated, and enforced its 3,500
financial-services portfolio against Capital One, and other similar financial
firms. IV’s conduct in asserting its entire financial-services portfolio
constitutes a barrier to the financial-services technology market that is
beyond self-correction because there are no substitutes to the portfolio
available.105 In the Virginia proceeding, Capital One “rel[ied] exclusively
on . . . ‘direct evidence’ of market power, namely . . . ‘supracompetitive
prices and restricted output.’”106 Moreover, IV “reportedly extracted $350
million from Verizon Communications . . . $120 million from Intuit Inc., and
between $200 million to $400 million from Cisco Systems, Inc.”107 The
money extracted from these various companies through patent portfolios
“bear no commercial or economic relation to the real financial worth of the
individual licensed patents, but reflect portfolio monopoly overcharges that
[IV] can impose due to its targeted aggregation, obfuscation, and related
anticompetitive practices.”108
In an analogous case, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak,
the Ninth Circuit recognized that Kodak’s 220-patent portfolio vastly
controlled design, tools, brand name power, and manufacturing
capabilities—which created a market barrier.109 IV owns approximately
80,000 patents and patent applications, including the 3,500 patents applying

103. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 42-53.
104. See supra Section I.
105. Capital One’s Reply Brief in Support of its Motion for Leave to File Third Amended
Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims (“Reply Brief ISO Countercls.) at 11-12, Intellectual
Ventures, 280 F. Supp. 3d 691.
106. Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One, No. PWG-14-111, mem. op. at 18, (D. Md. 2015).
107. Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One, No. PWG-14-111, mem. op. at 18, (D. Md. 2015).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Image Technical Services, 125 F.3d at 1208.
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to the financial-services technology market.110 Moreover, IV controls onehundred percent of the relevant market because: (1) they own the entire
portfolio, and (2) the patents contained within the portfolio are an
“indispensable body of patents, and licenses to patents held by other entities
cannot halt IV’s activities with respect to its financial-services portfolio.”111
Given the seemingly plenary volume of IV’s patent portfolio and track
record of targeting competition within the relevant market through patent
right enforcement, IV’s conduct constitutes anticompetitive behavior barred
by antitrust laws. Furthermore, this conduct is anticompetitive because, by
acquiring and enforcing such monopoly power, IV creates a barrier to market
entry. The barrier is IV’s extortion of alleged infringers through an
ultimatum of either an expensive and, mostly unnecessary, licensing
agreement or face costly litigation. Thus, by deploying business tactics,
IV—and similarly situated PAEs—unlawfully block alleged infringers at the
patent rights gate from competing in the market. This is because alleged
infringers simply cannot operate without PAEs’ patented technology, since
no viable substitutes usually exist.

III.

IV v. Capital One Cases Applied to the Antitrust Regime

A. IV’s Anticompetitive Conduct Caused Antitrust Injury

As previously discussed, courts apply a two-part test to evaluate
whether an antitrust injury exists: “(1) the causal connection between an
antitrust violation and harm to the plaintiffs, and whether the harm was
intended”; and “(2) whether the harm was of a type that Congress sought to
redress in providing a private remedy for violations of antitrust laws.”112 The
following explains how Capital One suffered the type of antitrust injury that
the antitrust laws aim to prevent. This is demonstrated by Capital One’s
adequate definition of the relevant market—IV’s financial-services patent
portfolio.113 And, furthermore, this antitrust injury can be imputed on to
similarly situated alleged infringers.
First, IV invoked federal court precedent to argue that Capital One
cannot assert Sherman Act and Clayton Act antitrust counterclaims because
the parties are not direct competitors.114 However, the Maryland district court

110. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *5.
111. Third Amended Countercomplaint at para. 164, Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One
Fin. Corp. (2014) (No. 14-0111).
112. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302, 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2007) .
113. Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One, No. PWG-14-111, mem. op. at 19 (D. Md. 2015).
114. Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One, No. PWG-14-111, mem. op. at 23 (D. Md. 2015);
see Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillian, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“[Section 2] directs itself not against conduct which
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contended that this Federal Circuit limitation is imposed on conduct and does
not bar antitrust claims by an entity that is not a competitor.115 The Supreme
Court also emphasized that the Sherman Act is “comprehensive in its terms
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden
practices” and “does not confine its protection to consumers, or to
purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers.”116 Therefore, Capital One is not
barred from asserting antitrust counterclaims because Capital One and IV
operate in the same financial-services market in a buyer-seller relationship.
Next, IV argued that Capital One lacked antitrust standing because they
did not suffer any actual antitrust injury.117 However, Capital One countered
that IV’s acquired portfolio would not have the same effect on the relevant
market if it were dispersed separately, as opposed to aggregated into one
portfolio.118 IV’s extensive patent portfolio unlawfully creates an extremely
high barrier to market entry because patents are by definition barriers to the
market (the purpose of patents is to grant the owner the right to exclude
others from profiting off of the patented invention).119
IV, thus, retains an enormous amount exclusive rights to essential
financial-services patents to which competitors cannot lawfully infringe;
thus, they are “held up” with no choice but to license the portfolio.120
Further, Capital One lacked the ability to expand output and challenge IV’s
high prices.121 Capital One was, therefore, left with no choice but to license
the 3,500 patent portfolio or subject baseless litigation as punishment.122
There is a clear causal connection between IV’s anticompetitive conduct in

is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition
itself.”)).
115. Id.
116. Id. .
117. Id.
118. Maryland case, Countercls.’ Reply 24 (citation omitted to Third Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 160,
175, 178-78) (“When the patents were in separate hands, banks could negotiate licenses more
consistently with the fair-lower prices that IV paid for the patents, and/or trust that disaggregation
would discourage anticompetitive enforcement of invalid patents. Now that IV has amassed those
patents into a single portfolio, banks have no way to avoid its exorbitant demands or serial litigation
threat.”).
119. Id. at 1208; Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) .
120. Reply Brief ISO Countercls. at 24-25, Intellectual Ventures I, LLC, 937 F.3d at 1369.
121. Reply Brief ISO Countercls. at 18-19.
122. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 215; see also Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d at 1208 (“Kodak has
consistently maintained a high share of the service market. These factors together with the
economies of scale, support a finding of high barriers to entry by new manufacturers and to
increased output by established suppliers.”); Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.,
899 F.2d 951, 968 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Entry barriers may include high capital costs or regulatory or
legal requirements such as patents or licenses.”); Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d at 450-51 (“[N]umerous
barriers to entry into the U.S. para-aramid fiber market exist and supply is low; DuPont has long
dominated the U.S. para-aramid fiber market; and DuPont currently controls over 70 percent of the
market.”).
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an unlawful monopoly and the extortive harm Capital One suffered.
Moreover, the harm Capital One suffered is explicitly barred by Section 2
and Section 7 because they are at a severe competitive disadvantage due to
IV’s unlawful monopoly.
Under Section 2 and Section 7, to establish antitrust standing a claimant
must prove: (1) monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) unlawful
use of that power.123 It is readily apparent that IV holds unlawful monopoly
power in the relevant financial-services market. Capital One must, therefore,
prove injury-in-fact through the vehicle of unlawful use of monopoly power.
Unlawful use of monopoly power is established by engaging in
anticompetitive conduct “to foreclose competition, to gain competitive
advantage, or to destroy a competitor.”124 Alternatively, a claimant must
allege the defendant willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power, and
not “from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.”125
IV is a PAE that has no commercial purpose beyond targeting
innovative companies for lucrative licensing agreements.126 IV does not
develop products. Their business model is based solely on acquiring patents
and almost exclusively targets the ex post licensing market for financialservices technology.127 An ex post licensing market is one where
“technology enabling business processes common throughout the
commercial banking industry in the United States . . . involves innovators
who have already built products and services incorporating widely known
technologies.”128 Capital One participates in the ex post licensing market
and sunk large investments into its technology solutions product lines. In
the ex post market, it is nearly impossible to cheaply abandon these product
lines.129 Because there are no substitute patents available in the relevant
market, Capital One is blocked from implementing its technology in the
market unless it licenses a 3,500-patent portfolio to avoid infringement of
the only viable patent out of the legally asserted 5 patents. It appears that IV
does not simply acquire monopoly power”from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, acumen, or history accident” but through
precise transactional dealings. These dealings are heavily calculated and
deployed as a means to gain control of entire markets throughout a multitude
of technology industries.130
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 481-83.
Id. (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
Id.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *5.
See Reply Brief ISO Countercls. at 16, Intellectual Ventures I, LLC, 937 F.3d at 1369.
See Reply Brief ISO Countercls. at 16, Intellectual Ventures I, LLC, 937 F.3d at 1369.
Id.
Id.

C - WENGER_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE)

576

4/8/2020 2:08 PM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 47:4

Further, it should be underscored that the purpose of a patent is to grant
a patent owner exclusive rights to the invention and corresponding profit in
exchange for disclosure, this right is not absolute. The Supreme Court holds
that patent rights may not be used to engage in anticompetition.131 IV, and
similar PAEs, violate this standard through massive acquisition and
aggregation of vital market patents. They then use their market power to
foreclose on their competition—Capital One and similar alleged infringers—
because there are no substitute patents available. Therefore, alleged
infringers like Capital One are left with little choice in order to compete in
the market.
Now, they must either license IV’s entire patent portfolio or contest
enforcement claims in court at high litigation costs. This results in an
anticompetitive effect prohibited by Section 2 and Section 7 because,
through enforcement of the unlawful monopolies, alleged infringers are held
up from using their platforms to compete. Additionally, alleged infringers’
time and resources are spent capitulating to an expensive license or tied up
in the courtroom. Therefore, Capital One has established an antitrust injury
due to IV’s direct anticompetitive conduct, which can then be imputed into
similarly situated PAE versus alleged infringer enforcement actions.
B. IV’s Unlawful Monopoly Violates Section 2 and Section 7

To make a sufficient antitrust claim under Section 2, a claimant must
plausibly plead monopolization.132
Allegations plausibly suggesting
monopolization and attempted monopolization that are “not merely
consistent with” monopolization is sufficient to meet the requirements of
Rule 8(a)(2).133 Finally, claims supported by conclusory statements do not
suffice.134 In order to survive Rule 8(a)(2), claims must be “well-pleaded,
nonconclusory factual allegation[s] . . . to give right to a ‘plausible
suggestion’” of monopolization and attempted monopolization.135
In order to clarify provisions of the Sherman Act, Congress enacted the
Clayton Act. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions
of stocks or assets where the effect “may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.”136 In totality, the Clayton Act
prohibits discriminatory prices, services, and allowances. Section 7
violation claims are subject to the same Rule 8(a)(2) requirements held in

131. Ford Motor Co v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 576 n.11 (1927) .
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2 ; see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007) .
133. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
134. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) .
135. Id. at 680.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 18 .
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Twombly and Iqbal.137 Thus, a claimant must plausibly suggest the
defendant acquired stocks or assets—in this case, patents—for the purpose
of substantially lessening competition or creating a monopoly.
C. IV’s Exclusionary Conduct through Unlawful Acquisition and
Aggregation of Thousands of Patents is Prohibited by Section 7

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions where
the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.”138 Further, Section 7 can be applied to patent acquisition.139 In
this context, the acquisition of patents must substantially decrease
competition, not merely have an anticompetitive effect.140 Thus, the conduct
threshold must be the exclusion of competition from the relevant market
through the enforcement of patent rights, since patents by definition give the
patent owner the right to exclude others.141
Courts are in agreement that anticompetitive behavior may satisfy the
exclusionary conduct requirement of monopolization under Section 7.142
Exclusionary conduct is defined as conduct that would “not make economic
sense for the defendant but for its elimination or softening of competition.”143
Under Section 2, there are six types of business conduct deemed
exclusionary: (1) vertical restrictions limiting competitor access to
customers or suppliers; (2) denials of rivals’ requests for access; (3) product
design and new product introduction; (4) predatory pricing; (5) misuses of
government and standard-setting processes; and (6) tortious conduct.144
Here, the applicable exclusionary conduct is IV’s denial of competitors’
requests for access to the relevant financial-services technology market. In
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technology Services (a separate matter than
the one discussed in Section II) while assessing a Section 2 claim, the
Supreme Court recognized that while “as a general matter a firm can refuse
to deal with its competitors . . . such a right is not absolute; it exists only if
there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal.”145 Further, the
137. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566 (Rule 8 requires that a complaint include facts, distinct
from legal labels and conclusions, giving rise to plausible entitlement to relief); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
680 (the Court held that Twombly applies to all civil suits, not just antitrust cases or complex cases).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
139. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1210 (2d Cir. 1981) .
140. Id.
141. “Patents”, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, https://www.wipo.int/
patents/en/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (“A patent is an exclusive right granted for an invention,
which is a product or a process that provides, in general, a new way of doing something, or offers
a new technical solution to a problem. To get a patent, technical information about the invention
must be disclosed to the public in a patent application.”).
142. JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 1-2 n.112 .
143. Id. at n. 128 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at n. 129.
145. 504 U.S. at n.32.
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Eastman Kodak Court held that denial of market access liability is
determined by “whether ‘valid business reasons’ can explain [the
defendant’s] actions.”146 Here, Capital One alleged that IV “conceals and
obfuscates [their] patent holdings” to where it is “practically impossible for
targets like Capital One to access the portfolio and take steps to avoid IV’s
claims of patent infringement.”147 Since IV holds a monopoly over the
relevant financial-services technology market, IV operates like the
gatekeeper to entry into said market for competitors, like Capital One.
Moreover, IV relied on SCM Corp. to argue that Capital One’s Section
7 claim fails because “the legality of an acquisition of patents under Section
7 [] is measured at the time of acquisition.”148 It is true that “[w]here a
company has acquired patents lawfully, it must be entitled to hold them free
from the threat of antitrust liability for the seventeen years that the patent
laws provide.”149 However, in its Section 7 application, the Maryland district
court correctly interpreted the Second Circuit when it determined that “at
some point, the [patent] acquisitions, as alleged, created a monopoly and
crossed the line to actionable under [Section] 7.”150
Additionally, Congress enacted Section 7 for the purpose of combatting
excessive mergers and acquisitions that hinder competition.151 The Supreme
Court recognized when it held Section 7’s original purpose was to “arrest
mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of
commerce was still in its incipiency.”152 Thus, it is not the lawfulness of
each individual patent acquisition that is applicable to Section 7 but, rather,
the effect of the patent portfolio’s totality on the relevant market. This
concept is demonstrated by IV’s acquisition of 3,500 financial-services
patent portfolio. The effect of IV’s massive acquisition and aggregation is
anticompetitive because the portfolio itself is an unlawful monopoly on the
entire relevant market. This is the exact anticompetitive behavior that
Section 7 seeks to abolish because IV is using unlawful merger and
acquisition means to achieve total control over the relevant market for
monetary gain.
Therefore, in sum, it is evident under Section 7 that Capital One
sufficiently alleged IV engaged in substantial exclusionary acts by denying
access to the relevant market to competitors, which violate U.S. antitrust

146. Id. at 483.
147. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 14-111, mem. op. at 22 (D.
Md. March 2, 2015).
148. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1211.
149. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1211-12.
150. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, mem. op. at 29.
151. The Antitrust Laws, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
152. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 317.
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laws. IV achieved this substantial reduction in competition through unlawful
acquisition of thousands of patents to gain unlawful monopoly power.
Massive patent acquisition leaves competitors with no choice but to license
the entire portfolio or, consequentially, enter into even more costly litigation.
Thus, IV’s exclusionary conduct places a significant restraint on trade that
Section 7 outlaws.
D. IV Further Violated Section 7 by Engaging in Patent Misuse

The patent misuse doctrine provides that the patent laws do not
support the proposition that a patentee may “prescribe by notice attached
to a patented machine the conditions of its use and the supplies which must
be used in the operation of it, under pain of infringement of the patent.”153
The Federal Circuit elaborated that patent misuse would only be found: (1)
when the patent owner’s conduct expands the scope of the patents in suit;
and (2) where anticompetitive effects in the relevant market are
established.154 Courts hold that conventional antitrust principles—
particularly the rule of reason—provide that possession of a monopoly is
only considered illegal when there is an unreasonable restraint on trade.
Furthermore, the patent misuse doctrine governs in the context of patent
acquisition and aggregation.155
In U.S. Philips Corp. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal
Circuit held that patent packaging should be evaluated under the rule of
reason and not deemed per se illegal.156 Under the rule of reason, the court
found no patent misuse when there are no commercially practicable
alternatives to the allegedly nonessential patents when licensing patent
packages.157 The court cited efficiencies of product-to-patent tying
arrangements, acknowledging problems associated with licensing patents
individually.158
Moreover, the U.S. Philips court relied on a DOJ principle that patent
packages “do not have undesirable effects of tying if they include patents to
technology for which there is no practical or realistic alternative.”159 Patent
misuse conduct is not considered anticompetitive “unless there is sufficient
demand for the purchase of [the tied product] separate from the [tying
product] to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer

153. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (citing Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., Co., 243 U.S. 501, 509 (1917)).
154. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .
155. USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) .
156. 424 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1193, 1198.
159. Id. at 1194.
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[the tied product].”160 Therefore, in this matter, the “tying product” equates
to nonessential patents in IV’s financial-services portfolio.161
However, this matter is distinct from U.S. Philips, along with prior
matters the Federal Circuit based this holding on.162 In U.S. Philips, the
patent packaging issue dealt with a refusal to license a specific product-topatent portfolio. In the Capital One cases, however, the alleged action is not
a refusal to license and far from specific patent portfolio.163 Capital One
alleged IV intentionally acquired “a massive patent portfolio,” comprised of
3,500 financial-services patents “that [IV] allege[d] reads, vaguely, on
existing products in [the financial-services] industry, regardless of how those
products are designed, so that it could hold up banks that have substantially
invested in those existing product designs.”164 Moreover, unlike U.S.
Philips, the patent portfolio in question is not comprised of patent-to-product
processes.165 IV has reversed this process by utilizing existing product
designs as targets to customize portfolios.166 Further, IV’s process begins
with targeting widely adopted and existing technology in the ex post
licensing market.167
The SCM Corp. court recognized the antitrust implications when a
patented product evolves into its own economic market or “engulf[s] a large
section of a preexisting product market” to where the antitrust and patent
laws clash.168 IV’s patent portfolio has engulfed the entire financial-services
technology product market. This occurred when IV acquired its essential
patents, packaged the patents a large portfolio containing thousands of

160. Id. (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984) ).
161. See JACOBSON, supra note 20, at n.550-54.
162. See SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1203 (“The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws
arises in the methods they embrace that were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the
antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor
with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented art.
When the patented product, as often is the case, represents merely one of many products that
effectively compete in a given market, few antitrust problems arise.”).
163. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, mem. op. at 21 (citing Third Am. Countercomplaint
at ¶¶ 173, 175).
164. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, mem. op. at 21 (citing Third Am. Countercomplaint
at ¶¶ 173, 175).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Third Amend. Countercomplaint at ¶ 180, Intellectual Ventures I LLC (“IV’s strategic
ex post patent aggregation is unlike the patent aggregation that bona fide operating companies
practice. In many instances, patent aggregation by companies with their own productive
commercial operations clears a path through patent portfolios that would otherwise frustrate the
commercialization of technology; that is, it protects the acquiring firm’s own products or design
freedom. The purpose and effect of IV’s aggregation are precisely the opposite: its patent
accumulation creates portfolios allowing IV to assert repeated claims of infringement to tax
productive commercial use of existing technology.”).
168. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1203.
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irrelevant (and likely invalid) patents, and, in turn, expensively licensed to
competitors whose products already existed in the market. Since financial
banking firms (IV’s competitors) need online banking technology in order to
serve their consumers, they are especially vulnerable to IV’s licensing
demands. These firms then license significantly more patents than necessary
to run their online banking technology because IV gives them no other option
in order to avoid infringement liability. Thus, IV’s patent acquisition
constitutes anticompetitive patent misuse conduct as prohibited by Section 7
of the Clayton Act.

IV. PAES are Not Entitled to Immunity under the
NOERR-Pennington Doctrine because their
Anticompetitive Conduct Falls within the
California Motor Sham Serial Litigation Exception
The Supreme Court held it is “axiomatic that a complaint should not be
dismissed unless ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”169
Additionally, the Supreme Court held that in antitrust cases “dismissals prior
to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted
very sparingly.”170 However, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may be raised
as an affirmative defense to antitrust counterclaims.
The Supreme Court first established this doctrine in two decisions
dealing with antitrust claims, E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington.171 The
Noerr-Pennington doctrine holds that “private actors are immune from
antitrust liability for petitioning the government, even when private actors’
motives are anticompetitive.”172 Under this doctrine, the Court recognized a
defense to antitrust laws that is derived from concerns regarding federalism
and the First Amendment right to petition the government for relief.173 The
Supreme Court interprets “petitions” to involve governmental relief
activities other than legislative lobbying.”174
169. McClain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ).
170. Hosp. Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (quoting Poller
v. Columbia Broad., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ).
171. E.R.R. Presidents Conf. 365 U.S. 127.
172. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-45 (1961) and United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965) ).
173. U.S. Const. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the . . . right of the
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
174. See Sanders, 504 F.3d at 912; see also Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) and Greenwood Utilities Comm’n. v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d
1484, 1505 (5th Cir. 1985).
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The rationale behind Noerr-Pennington immunity from antitrust
liability is two-fold. First, the Court held that allowing such liability would
“substantially impair the power of [state] government to take actions through
its legislature and executive that operate to restrain trade.”175 Second, “[t]he
right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights” and
the Sherman Act lacks congressional intent to infringe on such freedom.176
However, the Court narrowed the scope of Noerr-Pennington when it
established the “sham litigation” exception.177 The sham litigation exception
holds that activity “ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental
action” does not qualify for Noerr-Pennington antitrust liability immunity if
it “is a mere sham to cover . . . an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationship of a competitor.”178 This Note posits that the sham
litigation exception applies to PAEs because they engage in serial litigation
not based on the merits of their patent rights, but solely for monetary gain
and stifling competition.
A. The California Motor Standard is Appropriate because PAE Serial
Litigation is Anticompetitive Conduct

PAE serial enforcement actions fail the California Motor standard by
utilizing the court system as a weapon to shake down their technology
competitors notwithstanding the merits. In California Motor Transport Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, the Court dealt with a defendant accused of instituting
serial litigation for anticompetitive purposes.179 The Court observed that
litigation is unequivocally expensive and time-consuming.180 Further,
litigating a series of matters “can inflict a crushing burden on business.”181
Thus, the California Motor Transport Court recognized that litigating a
series of suits and other legal actions “without regard to the merits has far
more serious implications than filing a single action, and can serve as a
restraint on trade.”182

175. E.R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 137 .
176. Id. at 138 .
177. PREI, 508 U.S. at 113 .
178. E.R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 144 .
179. USS–PROSCO, 31 F.3d at 811 (citing Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508).
180. Id.
181. USS–PROSCO, 31 F.3d at 811 (citing Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508).
182. Id.; see also Primetime 24 Joint Ventures v. Nat’l Broad. Co. Inc., 219 F.3d 92, 101 (2d
Cir. 2000) (“In cases in which “the defendant is accused of bringing a whole series of legal
proceedings,” the test is not “retrospective” but “prospective”: “Were the legal filings made, not
out of a genuine interest in redressing grievances, but as part of a pattern or practice of successive
filings undertaken essentially for purposes of harassment?” . . . . [i]t is immaterial that some of the
claims might, “as a matter of chance,” have merit. The relevant issue is whether the legal challenges
“are brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for
the purpose of injuring a market rival.”).
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In such instances of PAE serial litigation, under California Motor
authority, the first prong of the PREI “sham litigation” exception test should
not be based on whether any of the proceedings have merit but, rather,
“whether they are brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings
without regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a market rival.”183
Courts determine this alternative factor by determining whether “the legal
filings [were] made, not out of genuine interest in redressing grievances, but
as part of a pattern of practice of successive filings undertaken essentially
for the purpose of harassment.”184
For example, in the Maryland action,185 Judge Grimm inappropriately
applied the PREI standard and failed to apply the California Motor standard
to the first prong, even though IV has filed numerous enforcement actions
against Capital One and dozens of other banks. As discussed earlier, IV filed
suit in Maryland while the Virginia action was still pending. But also, aside
from the Virginia and Maryland cases, IV also filed lawsuits against Capital
One in district courts across the country, including the Southern District of
Ohio and the Northern District of California.186 Therefore, this action and
similarly situated suits should be evaluated under the California Motors
Transport objective merit exception.
The FTC Report found that typical PAE negotiated licenses, valued at
millions of dollars, cover large portfolios (containing hundreds or thousands
of patents) without first suing the alleged infringer.187 These licenses
generate eighty percent of reported PAE revenue, or approximately $3.2
billion.188 However, under the litigation business model that is invoked after
an alleged infringer refuses to license these massive portfolios, PAEs initiate
costly litigation that is often settled shortly after, by entering into a licensing
agreement covering a smaller portfolio (approximately ten patents).189 But,
the early stage of litigation is estimated at $300,000.190 Meanwhile, the
license of these smaller portfolios yields royalties of less than $300,000.191
Moreover, PAEs engaging in the Litigation model characteristically create
new affiliate entities for each separate patent portfolio (typically ten patents

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id. at 811.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d 1359.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d 1359.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 42.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 42.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
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or less) that they acquired.192 These entities operate with little or no working
capital and enter into agreements with patent sellers to fund their business.193
Therefore, when building their portfolios, PAEs typically conduct
business as follows. First, they acquire massive patent portfolios from patent
sellers, frequently from manufacturing firms, by making large up-front
payments. Individual transactions may contain hundreds or thousands of
patents.194 Or, smaller portfolio transactions are often aggregated into larger
portfolios.195 Regardless of one lump transaction or small transaction
aggregation, PAEs then organize acquired patents into one or more large
portfolios and offered for licensing.196 The FTC Report found that seventyone percent of licenses were executed without litigation.197 Thus, it’s
assumed that PAEs likely threatened litigation to coerce alleged infringers
into entering an expensive license in order to avoid costly litigation.198 And,
when PAEs did file suit, “76% of their cases involved five to ten patents and
74% of their cases lasted more than a year.”199

200

192. Id.
193. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 4 (“Litigation PAEs filed 96% of the cases in the
study and accounted for 91% of the reported licenses, but only 20% of the reported revenue, or
approximately $800 million.”).
194. Id. at 46.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 46.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 45.
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When the California Motor standard is applied to this data, it is clear
that PAEs initiate litigation for the purpose of executing an expensive
licensing agreement and not for legitimate enforcement of their patent rights.
It is not merely a coincidence that the large portfolios are first offered to
potential infringers to license, often through a single written demand, but the
smaller portfolios are those that make it to court when disputes reach that
stage. Additionally, the PAEs Portfolio and Litigation business models are
prima facie evidence that PAEs are not concerned with the actual
enforcement of their patent rights. Rather, PAEs are concerned about
monetary gain through licensing and settlements because they do not
produce products that depend on patent exclusivity. Afterall, their entire
business model depends on the enforcement of these patent rights in itself
through licensing agreements.201
Moreover, the discovery in the Capital One Virginia case underscores
this PAE intentional disregard of the merits when they invoke the Litigation
business model once the Portfolio model fails. It should be noted that this
intentional disregard is likely discernible with similar PAEs when they are
individually assessed. In the Capital One Virginia case, documents
produced captured IV testimony confirming that the suits were brought
without regard to the merits—but in order to harm Capital One and other
banks. One of IV’s executives responsible for licensing to banks testified
that their list of certain patents demanded for license was “laughable”
because “[t]hey have nothing to do with banking.”202 And a spreadsheet of
portfolio catalogs reveals that many of the patents IV claimed were relevant
actually had nothing to do with banking, but included patents for “metal
treatments, aeronautics, and land vehicles.”203
Moreover, there is expert testimony that the PAE Portfolio model holds
such a monopoly over the relevant market through massive patent
acquisitions where no non-infringing substitutes exist nor is a design around
a viable option. In the Maryland case, Capital One’s expert economist Fiona
Scott Morton testified that IV had a monopoly in the financial-services
technology market, and Capital One could not “realistically ‘design around’
the patents.”204 Scott Morton determined that IV’s financial-services
portfolio was analogous to a “cluster market” promoted as a single product
where no close substitutes exist at a supracompetitive price.205 Thus, no
substitutes available to IV’s portfolio and they do, indeed, hold an unlawful
201. Id. at 42-53.
202. Capital One’s Corrected Nonconfidential Brief, supra note 58, at 7.
203. Id.
204. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 700 (“Scott Morton analogizes IV’s
financial-services patent portfolio to a “cluster market” that IV promotes as a single product (for
which there are no close substitutes) at a supracompetitive price.”).
205. Capital One’s Corrected Nonconfidential Brief, supra note 51, at 11.
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monopoly on the financial-services technology market. It logically follows,
that similarly situated PAEs ensure that no viable substitutes exist in order
to capitalize on the PAE Portfolio model, just like IV demonstrates.
B. PAE’s Portfolio Enforcement Suits Still Fail the PREI Non-Serial
Litigation
1. PAE Claims are so Objectively Baseless No Reasonable Litigant
Could Realistically Expect Success on the Merits

Even if the PREI standard was the appropriate standard, PAE’s conduct
would still qualify as “sham litigation” and, thus, should not be afforded
Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunity. The Court held that “[non-serial]
litigation cannot be deprived of immunity as a sham unless the litigation is
objectively baseless” and affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to characterize
a lawsuit as a sham that the antitrust defendant “admittedly had probable
cause to institute.”206 The PREI Court resolved whether litigation may be
sham merely because a subjective expectation of success does not motivate
the litigant, holding that “an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot
be sham regardless of intent.”207 In sum, for a non-serial lawsuit to qualify
as a sham litigation, the suit: (1) “must be objectively baseless in the sense
that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits”;
and (2) must be subjectively baseless and an attempt to interest with
competitors.”208 Under the first prong of the two-prong sham litigation
exception test, a claimant must prove that the lawsuit is “objectively baseless
in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on
the merits.”209 Additionally, if the suit contains objective merit, the claimant
cannot proceed to the subjective purposes prong and the action does not
constitute sham litigation .210 Thus, this prong is determined by whether “no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits” by filing
the lawsuit in question.211
PAE enforcement claims are objectively baseless and, thus, fail the first
prong of the PREI standard. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation
concerns plaintiff indirect purchasers of a brand name heart medication
manufactured by the defendants. The defendants asserted that plaintiffs
failed to sufficiently show that the suit was not objectively baseless and

206. Capital One’s Corrected Nonconfidential Brief, supra note 51, at 11.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 60-61 .
209. Id.
210. USS-POSCO Indus., 31 F.3d at 811.
211. PREI, 508 U.S. at 58 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S.
492, 502 (1988) and Vendo Co. v. Leftro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 645 (1977) ).
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brought for anticompetitive purposes.212 Plaintiffs argued but for the patent
infringement litigation the Hatch-Waxman 30-month period would not have
gone into effect, resulting in generic versions entering the market sooner.213
The plaintiffs supported their objectively baseless allegations with damning
communications.214 The court found that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient
facts to satisfy the objective prong because allegations in the plaintiffs’
complaint are construed in light most favorable to the plaintiffs.215
Similar to In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the party alleging counterclaims, facts alleged by
Capital One reasonably showed that IV initiated its suits asserting only five
patents out of the demanded 3,500-patent portfolio, many of which are
invalid or expired, and only two of the five remained viable, for objectively
baseless purposes.216 IV cofounder Edward Jung even described how IV
acquires patents only for the enforcement of market power once aggregated
and not the merits of the patent themselves. Jung stated, “[IV] buy[s] a bunch
of low-cost asset[s], which gives us market power” and “[i]t just feels like
we are on a diet of filler . . . . [W]e already have two funds with plenty of
fluff . . . . We didn’t kill as many deals [as] we should have, we just tried to
get them cheap and in most cases it was clear there was no future bet, the
patents just weren’t monetizeable or practiced.”217 Moreover, one of IV’s
outside inventors, hired to evaluate its patents, described the portfolio as
“poor quality financial-services related patents.”218
Furthermore, the Virginia district court determined that the remaining
asserted patents were ineligible subject matter under Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International.219 In Maryland, Capital One successfully sought a
declaratory judgment that the asserted patents were invalid, with one patent
invalid due to inequitable conduct.220 IV thus filed these suits against
Capital One in retaliation for Capital One’s refusal to expensively license.
Through IV’s own testimony and the asserted patents invalidation, no
reasonable litigant could have expected to win on the merits, making these
suits objectively baseless.221
The FTC also advises that “should the [asserted] patent be invalidated
in one case . . . it would make further litigation in the other cases
212. 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 642 (E.D. Mich. 2000) .
213. Id. at 642-43.
214. Id. at 645.
215. Id. at 644.
216. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, mem. op. at 18.
217. Id. at 6.
218. Brief for Appellants at 6-7, Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1368.
219. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1376 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208 (2014)).
220. Id. at 1-2.
221. Id.
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unnecessary.”222 And, the FTC since observed that PAEs may avoid
asserting patents, such as those in the Capital One cases, “if they expect that:
(1) the patents likely would be found invalid under Alice analysis, or (2) that
courts may dispose of the case in the early stages of litigation, under Alice
analysis.”223 Therefore, it follows that any PAE suits that are likely to be
invalid under Alice, and projected to settle in the early stages of litigation,
are objectively baseless under the PREI standard.
Between January 1, 2009, and September 15, 2014, PAEs participating
in The FTC Report study filed 2,452 patent infringement lawsuits, or 8.8%,
of the total 27,932 patent lawsuits filed during the study period.224 Of these
lawsuits, 66% settled within a year and 87% of cases terminated within the
study period.225 The FTC found that PAEs typically sued potential licensees
and settled shortly after entering into a license agreement covering a small
portfolio, as opposed to the large portfolios that are typically demanded
under the portfolio business model.226 Because the licenses are for relatively
low amounts in royalties (less than $300,000) and early stage litigation is
estimated to cost $300,000, the FTC determined this PAE behavior to be
“consistent with nuisance litigation.”227 Moreover, the FTC estimated that
PAEs in their study held more than 75% of all U.S. patents, and “any change
in PAE behavior with respect to software patents that results from Alice will
likely have a significant impact on both overall volume of PAE assertion and
the types of technologies that PAEs assert.”228
During its study, the FTC found that for all patents reported relating to
Information and Communication Technologies (“ICT”), 88% related to
Computers & Communications or Other Electrical & Electronic patent
technology categories and more than 75% were software-related patents.229
These figures are consistent with the generally held view that PAEs
disproportionately acquire and assert ICT and software patents. And though
the FTC study does not contain a census of all PAE patents, the sample
included a substantial fraction of all patents held by all PAEs during the

222. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 12.
223. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 136; Alice Corp., 573 U.S. 208, 217-18 (2014)
(holding that in determining patent eligibility a court must consider: (1) whether the patent claims
are directed to a patent ineligible concept, such as an abstract ides, and (2) if so, whether the claims
other elements transform the claim into a patent eligible concept).
224. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 55.
225. Id. at 55-72.
226. Id. at 4.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 136.
229. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 124.
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study period.230 Moreover, the Alice holding suggests that many software
patents may be invalid due to ineligible subject matter.231
When the FTC Report data is assessed in conjunction with the FTC’s
Alice ineligibility expectation advisory rule, it is reasonably inferred that
PAEs are aware of ineligibility under Alice and file enforcement actions
regardless. This inference is supported by PAE business models where they
demand a license on entire portfolios as a single product, containing
hundreds or thousands of patents. It is, thus, statistically certain that PAEs
initiate litigation knowing that these asserted patents are likely invalid under
Alice but still use the court system as a weapon to pressure alleged infringers
into a quick licensing agreement in the early litigation stage, settling the suit.
PAE enforcement suits are, therefore, objectively baseless.
2. PAEs Subjectively Intend to Use the Governmental Process to
Interfere with Accused Infringer’s Ability to Compete in the Relevant Market

Since PAE enforcement conduct, demonstrated by IV in the Capital
One cases, is objectively baseless, courts may next examine IV’s subjective
motivation.232 As previously stated, the Supreme Court requires the claimant
prove the antitrust violator’s subjective intent to use the governmental
process for anticompetitive purposes.233 Moreover, the Supreme Court
clarified that courts should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals
“an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor.”234 This concealment is shown through “use [of] the
governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of the that process—as
an anticompetitive weapon.235
In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, the Michigan district court
found plaintiffs satisfied the subjective prong.236 In construing the
allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the
Michigan district court found adequate facts in the defendants’
communications depicting their subjective anticompetitive motivation. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants intentionally “narrowed the scope of the
right of reference, despite their knowledge of what was directed by the FTC
so as to keep [plaintiffs’] generic products from being approved and thus
competing in the U.S. market for Cardizem.”237

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
added)).
236.
237.

Id. at 125.
Id. at 135.
PREI., 508 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144 (emphasis added)).
Id. at 61 (quoting Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 380 (emphasis
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
Id.
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In the Capital One cases, Capital One discovered evidence similar to
that of the In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation plaintiffs. Through
discovery in the related Virginia action, Capital One found email
communications and testimony reflecting IV’s subjective intent to interfere
with Capital One’s ability to compete in the relevant financial-services
market through endless threat of litigation to enforce IV’s unavoidable
portfolio.238 For example, IV stated in a meeting, after IV had sued Capital
One and a dozen other banks: “You either take what we’re offering now—if
you refuse, we will continue to bring suits, we will continue to come after
you and all the banks in the industry until you do.”239 IV went on to tell
Wells Fargo that “the industry should expect many rounds of litigation” and
there is no opportunity to “opt out.”240 IV’s threats thus gave Capital One
and other banks no option to negotiate down their expensive license demand
and backed the banks into a corner where they could essentially not provide
their online services to customers without a license to IV’s portfolio.
Furthermore, similar to most PAEs, IV’s entire patent acquisition
business model rests on utilizing hundreds if not thousands of shell
companies to acquire tens of thousands of patents in order to profit off of
licensing agreements. IV “holds up” competitors in the market by
threatening litigation if competitors do not agree to license IV’s entire
portfolio.241 IV refers to this licensing enforcement mechanism or threat of
litigation a “strategic tool,” a “HAMMER,” and a “[f]orcing function[] [to]
help close licensing deals.”242 As a nonproducing actor in the financialservices market, IV is notorious for using this business model to engulf the
entire relevant market.243 Moreover, IV’s history of and continuous
engagement in patent enforcement lawsuits supports a subjective intent to
utilize the courts for anticompetitive purposes, resulting in hundreds of
millions of dollars in licensing.244
Therefore, in viewing Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims in the light
most favorable to claimant, Capital One met its burden under the standard
set forth by the Supreme Court to sufficiently plead that IV’s enforcement
238. Intellectual Ventures I LL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177836, at *5.
239. Brief for Appellants at 11, Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1368.
240. Brief for Appellants at 11, Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 937 F.3d at 1368.
241. Id.
242. Id at 10.
243. See Michael Lipkin, Capital One Can Pursue Intellectual Ventures In Antitrust Case,
LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2015, 10:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/626900/capital-one-canpursue-intellectual-ventures-in-antitrust-case (“Capital One claimed banks have no choice but to
pay licensing fees to Intellectual Ventures or legal fees to defend themselves in court because the
company also owns 100 percent of the patents covering the online services they offer. Because the
patents are consolidated in one company, there is no competition to bring down excessive fees,
according to the bank.”).
244. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, mem. op. at 18.
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actions constitute a “sham litigation” exception to Noerr-Pennington
immunity. And because Capital One met its burden under the two-prong
PREI “sham litigation” exception test, IV does not have a First Amendment
right to petition the court for patent enforcement relief. Therefore, because
Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims should have proceeded, other similarly
situated accused PAE infringers should also be allowed to bring similar
antitrust counterclaims.

V. Solutions to Mitigate PAE Anticompetitive Conduct
A. Portfolio Business Model: Stronger Enforcement by Federal
Agencies

United States antitrust law concerns, among other areas, preventing
anticompetitive mergers or acquisitions. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
(“HSR”) allows the FTC and the DOJ to “review most of the proposed
transactions that affect commerce in the United States over a certain size.”245
Notwithstanding a few exemptions, current federal law requires companies
to report any merger or acquisition that is valued at more than $90 million to
the agencies for review and approval.246 However, PAEs typically engage
in low-cost transactions through shell companies; thus, circumventing the
federal reporting laws. Notwithstanding congressional action,247 it is
imperative that federal enforcement agencies utilize the current antitrust laws
under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act to investigate PAE conduct and
determine whether that conduct violated antitrust laws.
So how can federal enforcement agencies properly investigate and
enforce the antitrust laws on PAE acquisitions? First, top agency officials
must adopt a strict investigative and enforcement policy to encourage
competition in the patent industry that transcends administrative changes. It
is clear that the purpose of patent rights—the promotion of innovation in
science and useful arts248—has strayed far from that of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution. How can companies possibly
invest in innovation when they devote resources to costly licensing
245. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Merger Review, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resour
ces/mergers-and-competition/merger-review (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
246. Id.
247. Joshua D. Wright, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarkds at the Dechert Client Annual Antitrust
Spring Seminar (Apr. 17, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statem
ents/what-role-should-antitrust-play-regulating-activities-patent-assertion-entities/130417paespee
ch.pdf (In 2013, “Representatives Peter DeFazio and Jason Chaffetz introduced and subsequently
re-introduced the Saving High-tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act (“SHIELD
Act”) that singled out PAEs for a “loser pays” fee-shifting scheme. Even more recently, the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet held hearings to discuss
“abusive” patent litigation initiated by PAEs.”).
248. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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agreements or in the threatened alternative of costly litigation? Simply put,
they cannot invest in innovation. Therefore, federal agencies need to
promote innovation through rigorously PAE investigations and increasing
enforcement actions.
Second, federal agencies should implement aggressive monitoring of
patent sales between manufacturing firms and PAEs. Of course, federal
agencies cannot monitor every single PAE and its shell company out of the
thousands that exist. However, these agencies should conduct random
sampling and implement audits into PAE acquisitions. Depending on the
findings, this sampling technique may then trigger a more in-depth
preliminary investigation by such agencies as the U.S. Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission.
Federal enforcement agencies are critical to antitrust compliance and
promotion of competition. PAE patent aggregation has evolved into a
legitimate economic concern such that the FTC annually reports on the
issue.249 However, enforcement mechanisms for antitrust laws on PAEs are
significantly lacking. And it took Capital One, a private company,
counterclaiming antitrust violations in a civil suit for this issue to be taken
on in the court system for the first time. Agencies should, therefore, be wellaware of the damage PAE anticompetitive conduct causes and must
implement strict enforcement policies and procedures to remedy this damage
and deter future PAE anticompetitive acts.
B. Litigation Business Model: Allow Antitrust Counterclaims to
Proceed and Allow Discovery

There are many tools at the court’s disposal to mitigate PAE
anticompetitive conduct, especially since PAE enforcement suits represent a
large proportion of total annual patent litigation suits. First, courts must
accept the premise that PAEs directly compete with alleged infringers on the
micro-level of technology rights, with each patent considered a single
product and a portfolio the entire market. It is evident from PAE’s frequent
purchasing and aggregation of patents into mass portfolios, that patent
ownership rights have transformed from the original constitutional intent of
encouraging innovation by granting exclusive rights to competitive markets
of their own that stifles innovation through the threat and initiation of
extortive patent enforcement suits.
Second, once courts treat a portfolio as the relevant market, they must
allow plausible antitrust counterclaims to proceed past the motion to dismiss
stage and allow parties to engage in discovery in order to determine whether
PAEs initiated the suit based on the merits or for anticompetitive reasons.
The Capital One cases are prime examples of why these cases should move
249.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2.
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on to the discovery stage of federal proceedings. As discussed in previous
sections, IV knew when it sued Capital One that its financial-services
portfolio was full of invalid patents but, regardless of this, sued in multiple
federal courts. Further, the FTC Report supports the inference that, like IV,
almost all PAEs file enforcement suits of likely invalid patents for the same
purposes—anticompetition and profit. It is, thus, vital that antitrust
counterclaims are allowed to proceed to discovery.
Finally, when Noerr-Pennington immunity is asserted in serial
litigation matters, defending alleged infringers need to make clear in their
briefing that the matter is in fact serial litigation and that the California
Motor standard is the appropriate test, not the PREI standard. Courts should
be vigilant of the distinction in standards and whether the matter at bar is
indeed serial litigation. The aforementioned precautionary steps can help
ensure the correct application of antitrust jurisprudence in anticompetitive
PAE enforcement matters in order to better promote the constitutional goal
of technological innovation and economic competition.
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